NYT Magazine on Dean and 50-state strategy
The New York Times Sunday Magazine has a cover story on Dean and the "controversial" (i.e. doesn't give beltway consultants enough money) 50-state strategy. It's pretty good, but I think it misses some of the dividends the 50-state strategy is already paying. Opponents (like the leaders of the DSCC and DCCC) argue that we should throw everything into about 40 key districts to capture the House this year, because there is a unique historical opportunity to reverse Republican control. I would argue that it is the 50-state strategy that allows Democrats to take advantage of these waves of discontent: if you haven't been there fighting, you can't take advantage of the opportunities presented by things like the Foley ephebophilia scandal or Allen's racism difficulties or voter disillusionment over Iraq. There are many races this cycle that weren't expected to be competitive, but the are. If Democrats had concentrated only on the 40 elections that were supposed to be close, we would have left a lot of potential pickups on the table.
There's also a question of resource allocation: is it better to spend 10 million in one district to guarantee a victory, or spend 1 million in 10 districts and have only a small chance of victory in each? If by spending 1 million, you can give yourself a higher than 10% chance of winning in each of those 10, you're better off spreading the money around. In 10 races, even relatively longshot ones, there's bound to be a couple breaks that you won't be able to predict. The "run everywhere" strategy is also important just so Democrats in places like Nebraska don't feel completely demoralized and disengaged from the party.
Yes, this strategy costs money and resources to execute, and these resources are desperately needing in key battleground fights. But these costs are offset by the fact that this strategy forces the Republicans to spread their money around, too.
I don't know the electoral landscape well enough, or know enough about how money affects voting to know exactly where the "sweet spot" in terms how what kind of races the Democrats should be focusing on. These are number-crunching questions for the serious polling wonks. But the old Democratic strategy of conceding large swaths of territory (both geographically and demographically) to the Republicans seems not to have worked very well. And Democratic resurgences in places like Colorado and Kansas seem to indicate that there's Democratic potential in a lot of places.
There's also a question of resource allocation: is it better to spend 10 million in one district to guarantee a victory, or spend 1 million in 10 districts and have only a small chance of victory in each? If by spending 1 million, you can give yourself a higher than 10% chance of winning in each of those 10, you're better off spreading the money around. In 10 races, even relatively longshot ones, there's bound to be a couple breaks that you won't be able to predict. The "run everywhere" strategy is also important just so Democrats in places like Nebraska don't feel completely demoralized and disengaged from the party.
Yes, this strategy costs money and resources to execute, and these resources are desperately needing in key battleground fights. But these costs are offset by the fact that this strategy forces the Republicans to spread their money around, too.
I don't know the electoral landscape well enough, or know enough about how money affects voting to know exactly where the "sweet spot" in terms how what kind of races the Democrats should be focusing on. These are number-crunching questions for the serious polling wonks. But the old Democratic strategy of conceding large swaths of territory (both geographically and demographically) to the Republicans seems not to have worked very well. And Democratic resurgences in places like Colorado and Kansas seem to indicate that there's Democratic potential in a lot of places.
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